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Abstract Optimistic fair exchange (OFE) is a kind of protocols to solve the problem
of fair exchange between two parties. Most of the previous work on this topic are provably secure in the random oracle model. In this work we propose a new construction
of OFE from another cryptographic primitive, called time capsule signature. The construction is eﬃcient, and brings almost no overhead other than the primitive itself. The
security of our new construction is based on that of the underlying primitive without
relying on the random oracle heuristic. Applying our generic construction to the time
capsule signature scheme recently proposed by Libert and Quisquater, we obtain a new
concrete and eﬃcient OFE construction secure based on Computational Diﬃe-Hellman
assumption in the standard model.
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1 Introduction
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electronic network. Examples include the transfer of digital money, the delivery of video
or audio data and provision of telephone and Internet access. A common characteristic
of these types of services is that they normally cannot be revoked, i.e. once the service
has been granted, then the service provider has no mechanism to force the recipient
to return it. Therefore, the exchange of two digital services must occur simultaneously to ensure fairness for both parties. Unfortunately, real simultaneousness cannot
be achieved in general since digital services cannot be granted simultaneously. This is
due to the fact that any form of data transmitted requires some transmission time.
The exchange of digital signatures constitutes an important part of any e-commerce
transaction via the Internet, where participants do not trust each other. When the
signatures are on a common piece of text, this is often referred to as a contract signing
protocol.
Optimistic fair exchange (OFE), introduced by Asokan, Schunter and Waidner [1],
is a kind of protocols to solve the problems in fairly exchanging items between two
parties, say Alice and Bob. In such a protocol, there is an arbitrator who is semitrusted by Alice and Bob and involves only if one party attempts to cheat the other
or crashes. Let’s consider the following scenario, in which Alice wants to purchase a
software from Bob’s online shop. Alice ﬁrst partially authenticates a message saying
that she allows Bob to obtain the money from her bank account. After checking the
validity of Alice’s partial signature, Bob delivers the software to her. Later, if Alice is
honest, she will send her full signature to Bob, with which Bob can collect the money
from the bank. If Alice is dishonest and refuses to send back her full signature, Bob
will turn to the arbitrator for help. He shows to the arbitrator the evidence of fulﬁlling
his obligation, who will then resolve Alice’s partial signature into a full one, and send
it to Bob. With the full signature, Bob then can complete the transaction and obtain
the money from Alice’s bank account.
Since the introduction, OFE has attracted many researchers’ attention, such as [2,
3, 11, 28, 15, 23, 27, 34, 33, 4, 31, 17, 14, 22] and so on. Most of these works focus on singleuser setting, in which there are only one signer and one veriﬁer, as well as an arbitrator.
This setting is stand-alone and does not reﬂect the real world very well. A more practical setting is the multi-user setting [14], in which there are multiple signers and
veriﬁers, as well as an arbitrator. Each party could collude with other parties in order to cheat their counterparts. It is proved that security in single-user setting does
not imply security in multi-user setting [14]. Until now there are only a couple of OFE
schemes provably secure in multi-user setting, e.g. [14, 22], and some of them are secure
in the random oracle model [6] only. It is well known that security in this model is not
preserved when random oracles are replaced with real-life hash functions [12].

1.1 Our Contributions
In this work we propose a new approach to constructing schemes of optimistic fair exchange of digital signatures. We show that optimistic fair exchange schemes in multiuser setting can be generically constructed from time capsule signatures, a cryptographic primitive introduced by Dodis and Yum in 2005 [16]. The resulting OFE scheme
is as eﬃcient as the underlying time capsule signature scheme. Combining recent work
on time capsule signature in the standard model due to Libert and Quisquater [24], we
then get an optimistic fair exchange scheme which is secure based on Computational
Diﬃe-Hellman (CDH) assumption without random oracles in the multi-user setting.
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Table 1 below shows a brief comparison of our scheme with some existing results on
OFE in the multi-user setting, in terms of signature sizes, underlying assumptions and
the need of random oracle model. From the comparison we can see that our scheme is
the only one secure in the standard model, i.e. without random oracles, and without
assuming a common reference string. The security of our scheme is based on a very
standard number-theoretic assumption, e.g. Computational Diﬃe-Hellman assumption.
In Sec. 7 we will give a more detailed comparison.

Table 1 A brief comparison with some existing results in the multi-user setting

PSig
Sig
Assump
Model
Notes.

[14]
3t + 2Zq + 1Z∗n
2t + 1Zq + 1Z∗n
RSA + DL
ROM

[22] Inst 1
2G
8G
CDH
CRS

[22] Inst 2
1G + 1Zn
12G + 5Zn
SDH + SGD
CRS

[22] Inst 3
2G + 2Zp
5G + 5Zp
Poly-SDH
CRS

Ours
3G
6G
CDH
STD

– In the concrete scheme proposed in [14], n is an RSA modulus, p is a prime larger than n,
q is a prime such that q|p − 1, and t is an integer such that 2t < q.
– Inst 1 in [22] instantiates the conventional signature with Waters signature [32] and the
ring signature scheme with Schacham-Waters scheme [30].
Inst 2 in [22] instantiates the conventional signature with Boneh-Boyen signature [8] and
the ring signature scheme with Chandran-Groth-Sahai scheme [13].
Inst 3 in [22] instantiates both the conventional signature and the ring signature with
Boyen’s mesh signature [10].
In both Inst 1 and Inst 2, the group G is a bilinear group of composite order n = p q  ,
instead of prime order.
– In our scheme, group G is of prime order p and GT is the target group of the bilinear
pairing.
Legends:
CDH: Computational Diﬃe-Hellman Assumption
SDH: Strong Diﬃe-Hellman Assumption
Poly-SDH: Poly Strong Diﬃe-Hellman Assumption
ROM: Random Oracle Model

DL: Discrete Logarithm Assumption
SGD: Subgroup Decision Assumption
CRS: Common Reference String Model
STD: Standard Model

1.2 Related Works
(Optimistic Fair Exchange). Since the introduction, OFE has attracted many researchers’
attention, such as [2, 3, 11, 28, 15, 23, 27, 34, 33, 4, 31, 17, 14, 22] and so on. To name a few,
Asokan et al. studied the fair exchange of digital signatures in [2]. Park et al. proposed
an OFE scheme following the sequential two-party multisignature paradigm [28], which
was later broken by Dodis et al. [15]. Dodis et al. also proposed a repaired scheme, in
which each user registers a key with the arbitrator. Micali used a chosen-ciphertext secure public key encryption scheme with recoverable randomness to build another OFE
scheme [27], which was cryptanalyzed by Bao et al. [4].
Since most of signature schemes in the literature are provably secure in the random
oracle model [6], in which all parties have oracle access to a truly random function,
most of schemes of OFE of signatures have provable security in this model as well.
However, such a model is only heuristic. Provable security of schemes in this model
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doesn’t guarantee anything about the security when the random oracles are replaced
with real-life hash functions [12].
Prior to Dodis et al.’s work [14], almost all previous works on OFE considered the
single-user setting only, in which there are only one signer and one veriﬁer (along with
an arbitrator). They considered a more practical setting, called the multi-user setting,
in which there are many signers and many veriﬁers (along with an arbitrator), so that a
dishonest party can collude with some other parties in an attempt of cheating another
party [14]. Although security of public key encryption and that of digital signature
in the single-user setting are preserved in the multi-user setting [5, 18], Dodis et al.
showed that this is not necessarily true for optimistic fair exchange. They gave a
counterexample that is secure in the former setting but insecure in the latter setting.
A dishonest veriﬁer succeeds in converting the signer’s partial signature into a full one
by colluding with the veriﬁer in another transaction of exchange.
In a more recent work [22] Huang et al. further improved Dodis et al.’s result by
considering a more relaxed public key model called chosen-key model [26], in which
the adversary is allowed to choose public keys arbitrarily without requiring to show its
knowledge of the corresponding private keys. They showed that there is a gap between
security of OFE in the chosen-key model and that in the certiﬁed-key model considered
in [14] and previous works, in which the adversary has to prove its knowledge of the
secret key before using a public key. They further proposed a generic construction
of OFE in the chosen-key model without random oracles, which is based on a ring
signature [29] and a standard signature [19].
A natural approach to constructing OFE is to use the arbitrator’s public key to
encrypt the signer’s signature and then provide a non-interactive proof to show that
the ciphertext indeed contains a valid signature of the signer. This is the well-known
paradigm of constructing OFE from veriﬁably encrypted signature (VES) [9]. In general
we can always obtain such a scheme using NP-reduction. But eﬃciency is the issue
preventing the resulting scheme from practical use. It is trivial to come up with a
concrete and eﬃcient instantiation of this paradigm secure in the standard model. To
the best of our knowledge, the only known VES scheme secure without random oracles
is due to Lu et al [25], which is based on Waters signature scheme [32]. However,
their scheme is merely proved to be secure in the single-user setting (and under the
certiﬁed-key model).
(Time Capsule Signature). In FC 2005, Dodis and Yum [16] proposed the notion of
time capsule signature. In a time capsule signature scheme, there is a semi-trusted
time server, which honestly publishes the corresponding secret information at each
time event t. Alice produces a ‘premature’ signature σ  on a message m, which is
claimed to become ‘mature’ at time event t, and sends it to Bob, which veriﬁes the
validity of σ  . At time t, the time server publishes the secret information with respect
to t, which can be used by anybody to convert σ  into a matured signature of Alice.
Besides, Alice can also pre-hatch her signature σ  before the claimed time t.
Recently Hu et al. [20] proposed an eﬃcient time capsule signature scheme based
on Waters signature [32], which in turn is based on Computational Diﬃe-Hellman
(CDH) assumption. Their scheme is proved to be secure without random oracles. However, pre-hatched signatures are distinguishable from the hatched signatures, thus not
satisfying the ambiguity (see Sec. 3.2 for deﬁnition). Libert and Quisquater [24] later
proposed another time capsule signature scheme secure without random oracles, which
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is based on Waters signature [32] as well. Diﬀerent from [20], their scheme satisﬁes the
ambiguity.

1.3 Paper Organization
We review the deﬁnitions and security models of optimistic fair exchange and time
capsule signature in Sec. 2 and Sec. 3, respectively. Our generic construction of OFE
is then proposed in Sec. 4. The security of it is analyzed in Sec. 5. In Sec. 6 we give a
concrete instantiation of our construction, which is then compared with some existing
OFE schemes secure in the multi-user setting in Sec. 7. The paper is concluded in
Sec. 8.

2 Deﬁnitions and Security Model
Let k ∈ N be a security parameter. If x is a binary string, |x| denotes the length of x; if
S is a set, |S| denotes the cardinality of S. For any binary strings x and y, xy denotes
the concatenation of x and y. By x ← S we denote the operation that process S is
performed and the output is x if S is an algorithm, or that x is randomly and uniformly
selected from S if it is a distribution. By x := (a, b, c) we denote the simple assignment
operation. By ‘PPT’ we mean that an algorithm runs in probabilistic polynomial-time.
A function f is said to be negligible in k, if for every positive polynomial poly(·) and
for all suﬃciently large k, we have that f (k) < 1/poly(k).

2.1 Deﬁnitions in the Multi-User Setting
Our deﬁnition for non-interactive optimistic fair exchange (OFE) follows the one in
the multi-user setting given in [14].
Deﬁnition 1 A non-interactive optimistic fair exchange (OFE) involves two users (a
signer and a veriﬁer) and an arbitrator, and is formalized using the following PPT
algorithms:
SetupTTP . On input 1k , it generates a secret arbitration key ASK and a public partial
veriﬁcation key AP K.
SetupUser . On input 1k and (optionally) AP K, it outputs a secret/public key pair
(SK, P K). For a user Ui , we use (SKUi , P KUi ) to denote the user’s key pair.
Sig/Ver. Similar to the signing and veriﬁcation algorithms of an ordinary digital signature scheme, Sig(m, SKUi , AP K) outputs a signature σUi , while Ver(m, σUi ,
P KUi , AP K) outputs 1 for acceptance or 1 for rejection, where message m is chosen by user Ui from the message space M deﬁned under P KUi .
PSig/PVer. They are partial signing and veriﬁcation algorithms, respectively, where
PSig together with Res (deﬁned below) should be functionally equivalent to Sig.
PSig(m, SKUi , AP K) outputs a partial signature ξUi , while PVer(m, ξUi , P KUi ,
AP K) outputs 1 for acceptance or 0 for rejection.
Res. This is the resolution algorithm. Res(m, ξUi , ASK, P KUi ) outputs a signature
σUi , or ⊥ indicating the failure of resolving a partial signature.
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In a typical OFE protocol run, the signer Ui ﬁrst generates the partial signature
ξUi using PSig and sends it to the veriﬁer. The veriﬁer then checks the partial signature
using PVer and fulﬁlls his obligation if PVer outputs 1. After which, the signer sends
the full signature σUi to complete the transaction. If no problem occurs, the arbitrator
does not participate in the protocol. However, if the signer refuses to send σUi at
the end, the veriﬁer will send ξUi as well as a proof of fulﬁlling his obligation to the
arbitrator. The arbitrator will generate σUi using Res and sends it to the veriﬁer if the
proof sounds. Similar to previous deﬁnitions (e.g. [15, 14]), the deﬁnition does not deal
with the application-speciﬁc question of how the veriﬁer proves to the arbitrator that
he has fulﬁlled his obligation to the signer. However, unlike previous deﬁnitions, we do
not assume the authenticity of public keys.
Remark 1 (An Optional Input of SetupUser ). In the deﬁnition above, AP K is an
optional input of SetupUser . This allows the arbitrator and the users to share some
common system parameters without getting involved in any interactive registration
phase. The advantage is that the setup-free feature [35, 36] can be ensured while having
common system parameters shared across the entire system without having a dedicated
system parameter generation algorithm deﬁned. For schemes where the users and the
arbitrator do not share any system parameter, AP K can simply be removed from the
input of SetupUser .

2.2 Security Models
The correctness requires that for all security parameters k ∈ N, (ASK, AP K) ←
SetupTTP (1k ), (SKUi , P KUi ) ← SetupUser (1k , AP K), let ξUi ← PSig(m, SKUi , AP K),
each of the following equations holds with probability 1:
PVer(m, ξUi , P KUi , AP K) = 1,
Ver(m, Sig(m, SKUi , AP K), P KUi , AP K) = 1, and
Ver(m, Res(m, ξUi , ASK, P KUi ), P KUi , AP K) = 1.
The ambiguity property requires that the distribution of full signatures generated by
the signer should be (computationally) indistinguishable from that of full signatures
resolved by the arbitrator on input valid partial signatures. Formally, denote by
def

Σ0 = {Sig(m, SKUi , AP K)}m∈{0,1}∗
and

def

Σ1 = {Res(m, PSig(m, SKUi , AP K), ASK, P KUi )}m∈{0,1}∗ .
We also denote by Σ0 (m) (resp. Σ1 (m)) the subspace of Σ0 (resp. Σ1 ) deﬁned by m ∈
{0, 1}∗ . For any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm D, the following probability
should be negligibly close to 1/2:
Pr[m ← {0, 1}∗ , b ← {0, 1}, σ ← Σb (m), b ← D(P KUi , AP K, m, σ) : b = b].
Ambiguity is useful in applications of OFE, in which the signer does not want to
let others know whether a signature is resolved by the arbitrator. For example, Alice
and Bob execute an OFE protocol to sign a contract online, but due to the internet
fault, Alice fails to return her full signature in time. Thus, Bob asks the arbitrator to
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resolve her signature. If the scheme is not extraction ambiguous, outsiders may think
Alice is cheating, and this reduces the credit of Alice.
Readers may note that the deﬁnition of ambiguity above does not discuss if the
adversary has any oracle access. In fact, similar to ring signature, we may specify various
levels of ambiguity for OFE as well. They may include basic ambiguity, ambiguity with
respect to adversarially-chosen keys, and ambiguity against attribution attacks/full key
exposure. Readers may refer to [7] for their deﬁnitions in the context of ring signature.
The ambiguity deﬁnition above follows that given in [15, 14] with the sole purpose of
making the construction of OFE non-trivial. For stronger notions, say basic ambiguity,
we may require that no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary can distinguish full
signatures generated by the signer from those resolved by the arbitrator with nonnegligible advantage, even if the adversary can access partial signature oracle and
resolution oracle.
The security of optimistic fair exchange consists of three aspects: security against
signers, security against veriﬁers, and security against the arbitrator. The deﬁnitions
of them in the multi-user setting are given as follows.
Security Against Signers. Intuitively, we require that no PPT adversary A should
be able to produce a partial signature with non-negligible probability, which looks
good to veriﬁers but cannot be resolved to a full signature by the honest arbitrator.
This ensures the fairness for veriﬁers, that is, if the signer has committed to a
message, the veriﬁer will always be able to get the full commitment of the signer.
Formally, we consider the following experiment:
SetupTTP (1k ) → (ASK, AP K)
(m, ξ, P K ∗ ) ← AORes (AP K)
σ ← Res(m, ξ, ASK, P K ∗ )
Success of A := [PVer(m, ξ, P K ∗ , AP K) = 1 ∧ Ver(m, σ, P K ∗ , AP K) = 0]
where oracle ORes takes as input a valid partial signature ξ of user Ui on message m,
i.e. (m, ξ, P KUi ), and outputs a full signature σ on m under P KUi . The advantage
of A in the experiment AdvA (k) is deﬁned to be A’s success probability.
Security Against Veriﬁers. This security notion requires that any PPT veriﬁer B
should not be able to transform a partial signature into a full signature with nonnegligible probability if no help has been obtained from the signer or the arbitrator. This requirement has some similarity to the notion of opacity for veriﬁably
encrypted signature [9]. Formally, we consider the following experiment:
SetupTTP (1k ) → (ASK, AP K)
SetupUser (1k ) → (SK, P K)
(m, σ) ← B OPSig ,ORes (P K, AP K)
Success of B := [Ver(m, σ, P K, AP K) = 1 ∧ (m, ·, P K) ∈ Query(B, ORes )]
where oracle ORes is described in the previous experiment, the partial signing oracle
OPSig takes as input a message m and returns a valid partial signature ξ on m under
P K, and Query(B, ORes ) is the set of valid queries B issued to the resolution oracle
ORes . The advantage of B in the experiment AdvB (k) is deﬁned to be B’s success
probability.
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Security Against the Arbitrator. Intuitively, this security notion requires that any
PPT arbitrator C should not be able to generate with non-negligible probability a
full signature without explicitly asking the signer for generating one. This ensures
the fairness for signers, that is, no one can frame the actual signer on a message
with a forgery. Formally, we consider the following experiment:
∗

SetupTTP (1k ) → (ASK ∗ , AP K)
SetupUser (1k ) → (SK, P K)
(m, σ) ← C OPSig (ASK ∗ , AP K, P K)
Success of C := [Ver(m, σ, P K, AP K) = 1 ∧ (m, ·) ∈ Query(C, OPSig )]
∗

where SetupTTP denotes the run of SetupTTP by a dishonest arbitrator (run by
C), the partial signing oracle OPSig is described in the previous experiment, ASK ∗
is C’s state information, and Query(C, OPSig ) is the set of queries C issued to the
partial signing oracle OPSig . The advantage of C in this experiment AdvC (k) is
deﬁned to be C’s success probability.
Deﬁnition 2 A non-interactive optimistic fair exchange scheme is said to be secure
in the multi-user setting if there is no PPT adversary that wins any of the experiments
above with non-negligible advantage.
Since we are considering certiﬁed-key model in this work, in all the aforementioned
experiments the adversary has to prove its knowledge of secret key for each public
key it chooses and uses. Usually, we give the adversary access to an extra oracle, Okr ,
which takes as input a key pair (P K, SK) and (stores SK and) returns P K if the
pair is well-formed, i.e. (P K, SK) is a possible output of the key generation algorithm,
and ⊥ otherwise. If we consider chosen-key model, the adversary does not have such a
restriction during the attack.

2.3 On the Multi-Arbitrator Setting
One may also notice that in the experiment for formalizing Security Against the Arbitrator, the adversary C has two phases. In the ﬁrst phase, C merely generates AP K
without having access to OPSig . In the second phase, C is to generate a forgery while
allowing access to OPSig with respect to AP K. The purpose of having this two-phase
arrangement is to make sure that the model is under the single-arbitrator setting. Although all the security requirements of optimistic fair exchange schemes are studied
under the multi-user setting in this paper, to be consistent with previous work [15,
14], we restrict ourselves to focus on the formalization of a system which allows only
one arbitrator. On the other side, if we combine the two phases in the experiment for
Security Against the Arbitrator into one, that is, the second and the third statements
are combined and replaced as follows,
(AP K, m, σ) ← C OPSig (P K)
and modify OPSig by taking an additional input, which is a public partial veriﬁcation
key AP K  , then we are able to consider the multi-arbitrator setting for this security notion (by also changing the restriction such that we only require (m, ·, AP K)
∈
/ Query(C, OPSig )).
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2.4 On the Validity of a Partial Signature
In optimistic fair exchange, a partial signature shows that Alice (the signer) is willing
to exchange items with Bob (the veriﬁer). For example, in the schemes proposed in
[14, 22], the signer’s partial signature is its signature on the message generated using a
standard signature scheme. Due to its public veriﬁability (e.g. using PVer algorithm),
Bob can show to anyone else Alice’s will by releasing the partial signature it received
from Alice, and possibly obtain beneﬁt from other parties. Huang et al. addressed this
issue, and proposed the notion of ambiguous optimistic fair exchange [21], in which
it is required that partial signatures of Alice are indistinguishable from those of Bob.
However, this is out of the scope of our work, as we focus on traditional type of
optimistic fair exchange.

3 Time Capsule Signatures
3.1 Deﬁnition
Time capsule signature, introduced by Dodis and Yum in [16], is a kind of digit signature schemes which allows a signature to bear a (future) time t so that the signature
will only become valid at time t or later, after a semi-trusted third party, called time
server, releases time-dependent information. Besides, the real signer of a time capsule
signature has the privilege to make a time capsule signature valid before time t.
Deﬁnition 3 ([16]) A time capsule signature scheme is speciﬁed by an 8-tuple of
PPT algorithms (SetupTS , SetupUser , TSig, TVer, TRelease, Hatch, PreHatch, Ver) such
that:
SetupTS . This setup algorithm is run by the Time Server. It takes a security parameter
1k and returns a private/public time release key pair (T SK, T P K).
SetupUser . This setup algorithm is run by each user. It takes as input 1k and returns
the user’s private/public key pair (SK, P K).
TSig. The time capsule signature generation algorithm TSig takes as input (m, SK,
T P K, t) where t ∈ T is a speciﬁc time event from which the signature becomes
valid, and outputs a time capsule signature ξt .
TVer. The time capsule signature veriﬁcation algorithm TVer takes (m, ξt , P K, T P K, t)
and returns 1 for acceptance or 0 for rejection.
TRelease. This time release algorithm TRelease takes as input (t, T SK). At the beginning of each time event t, the time server publishes zt ← TRelease(t, T SK).
Hatch. This algorithm is run by any party and is used to open a valid time capsule
signature which became mature. It takes as input (m, ξt , P K, T P K, zt ) and returns
a hatch signature σt .
PreHatch. This algorithm is run by the signer and used to open a valid time capsule
signature which is not mature yet. It takes as input (m, ξt , SK, T P K, t) and returns
the pre-hatched signature σt .
Ver. This algorithm is used to verify a hatched or pre-hatched signature. Ver takes as
input (m, σt , P K, T P K, t) and returns 1 for acceptance or 0 for rejection.
The time server runs SetupTS to generate its key pair, and each user runs SetupUser
to generate a user key pair. Any user can run TSig to produce a time capsule signature
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to be valid at some time period t, and can later make its signature mature before t by
running PreHatch. At each time period t, the time servers runs TRelease to release some
secret information related to t with which any user can make a time capsule signature
mature and verify its validity.

3.2 Security Models
The correctness requirement states that for any m ∈ {0, 1}∗ and t ∈ T , let ξt ←
TSig(m, SK, T P K, t) and zt ← TRelease(t, T SK), each of the following equations holds
with probability 1:
TVer(m, ξt , P K, T P K, t) = 1,
Ver(m, Hatch(m, ξt , P K, T P K, zt ), P K, T P K, t) = 1, and
Ver(m, PreHatch(m, ξt , SK, T P K, t), P K, T P K, t) = 1.
The ambiguity property requires that the “hatched signature” σ̃t is (computationally)
indistinguishable from the “pre-hatched signature” σt , even if the distinguisher knows
T SK.
The security of time capsule signatures consists of three aspects: security against
the signer Alice, security against the veriﬁer Bob and security against time server. In
the following, we denote by OTSig the oracle simulating the algorithm TSig, which takes
(m, t) as input and returns Alice’s time capsule signature ξt , by OTR the time release
oracle, which takes t as input and returns the secret time information zt , and by OPreH
the oracle simulating algorithm PreHatch, which takes (m, t, ξt ) as input and returns
Alices’ pre-hatch signature σ.
Security Against Alice. We require that any PPT adversary A could succeed with
at most negligible probability in the following experiment:
SetupTS (1k ) → (T SK, T P K)
(m, t, ξt , P K) ← AOTR (T P K)
zt ← TRelease(t, T SK)
σt ← Hatch(m, ξt , P K, T P K, zt )
Success of A := [TVer(m, ξt , P K, T P K, t) = 1 ∧ Ver(m, σt , P K, T P K, t) = 0]
Security Against Bob. We require that any PPT adversary B could succeed with
at most negligible probability in the following experiment:
SetupTS (1k ) → (T SK, T P K)
SetupUser (1k ) → (SK, P K)
(m, t, σt ) ← B OTSig ,OTR ,OPreH (P K, T P K)
Success of B := [Ver(m, σt , P K, T P K, t) = 1 ∧ t ∈ Query(B, OTR )∧
(m, t, ·) ∈ Query(B, OPreH )]
where Query(B, OTR ) is the set of queries B issued to the time release oracle OTR ,
and Query(B, OPreH ) is the set of valid queries B issued to the pre-hatch oracle
OPreH , i.e., (m, t, ξt ) such that TVer(m, ξt , P K, T P K, t) = 1.
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Security Against Time Server. We require that any PPT adversary C could succeed with at most negligible probability in the following experiment:
∗

SetupTS (1k ) → (T SK ∗ , T P K)
SetupUser (1k ) → (SK, P K)
(m, t, σt ) ← C OTSig ,OPreH (P K, T P K, T SK ∗ )
Success of C := [Ver(m, σt , P K, T P K, t) = 1 ∧ (m, ·) ∈ Query(C, OTSig )]
∗

where SetupTS denotes the run of SetupTS with a dishonest time server (run by
C), T SK ∗ is C’s state after this run, and Query(C, OTSig ) is the set of queries C
issued to the time capsule signature generation oracle OTSig with the restriction
that (m, t ) ∈ Query(C, OTSig ) for all t ∈ T .

4 Our Optimistic Fair Exchange Scheme
In this section, we will show another way of constructing OFE schemes secure in the
multi-user setting and certiﬁed-key model. Let TCS = (SetupTS , SetupUser , TSig, TVer,
TRelease, Hatch, PreHatch, Ver) be a time capsule signature scheme. In the following,
we show how to use TCS to build an optimistic fair exchange scheme OFE secure in
the multi-user setting and the certiﬁed-key model.
Let k be the security parameter. Suppose that H : {0, 1}∗ → T is a collision-free
hash function, where T is the space of time events. Without loss of generality, we assume
that the size of T is super-polynomial in k. This is to ensure the collision-freeness of
H.
SetupTTP . The arbitrator runs TCS.SetupTS (1k ) to generate a key pair (T SK, T P K),
and sets (ASK, AP K) := (T SK, T P K).
SetupUser . Each user Ui generates a public/private key pair by computing (SKUi ,
P KUi ) ← TCS.SetupUser (1k ).
Sig. On input a message m, the signer Ui generates a time event t 1 by computing
t ← H(m, P KUi ).
It then computes the full signature as
σ ← TCS.PreHatch(m, ξ, SKUi , AP K, t),
where ξ ← TCS.TSig(m, SKUi , AP K, t).
Ver. On input a message m and a signature σ purportedly produced by Ui , the veriﬁer
computes t ← H(m, P KUi ) and returns
TCS.Ver(m, σ, P KUi , AP K, t).
1 The reason of computing t rather than randomly selecting t is to ensure that in the
generation of each signature, the time event is distinct if the message or the signer is diﬀerent,
which is important in the proof of security against veriﬁers. To be shown later, as in the proof
of Lemma 2.
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PSig. On input a message m, the signer Ui computes
ξ ← TCS.TSig(m, SKUi , AP K, t).

t ← H(m, P KUi ),

It returns ξ.
PVer. On input a message m and a partial signature ξ purportedly produced by Ui ,
the veriﬁer computes
t ← H(m, P KUi ),

b ← TCS.TVer(m, ξ, P KUi , AP K, t),

and returns the bit b.
Res. On input a message m and a partial signature ξ of user Ui , the arbitrator ﬁrst
checks if ξ is a valid signature on m with respect to P KUi . If not, it rejects the
input by outputting ⊥; otherwise, it computes
t ← H(m, P KUi ),

zt ← TCS.TRelease(t, ASK),

and
σ ← TCS.Hatch(m, ξ, P KUi , AP K, zt ).
The arbitrator returns σ.
This construction is setup-free. The stand-alone property depends on that of the
underlying time capsule signature. The correctness of OFE is obvious and the ambiguity property simply follows that of TCS.
Remark 2 (On the Space T of Time Events) As of our best knowledge, all the time
capsule signature schemes in the literature [16, 20, 24]2 put no restriction/limitation on
the range of possible time events. In fact, the time event t in these schemes can take
any values from {0, 1}∗ , since a mechanism analogous to identity-based cryptography is
used in their constructions, and t behaves as an identity. Therefore, it is reasonable for
us to assume that the size of T is at least super-polynomial in the security parameter,
or large enough for guaranteeing the collision-resistance of H. Besides, if the time event
t can take any arbitrary value (i.e., {0, 1}∗ ), then we can simply remove H in our
construction above for reducing the basic assumption for building OFE . That is, we
directly use mP KUi instead of the hashed value of it as the ‘time event’ t.

5 Security Analysis
For the security of the above construction of OFE, we have the following theorem. Note
that since the security of time capsule signatures is deﬁned in a compatible and very
similar way to that of OFE in [14], in the following, we only show the security of OFE
in the certiﬁed-key model.
Theorem 1 If there exist secure time capsule signature schemes and collision-free hash
functions, there exist secure optimistic fair exchange schemes in the multi-user setting
and the certiﬁed-key model.
2 We note that schemes in [20] are not ambiguous. That is, the pre-hatched signatures are
distinguishable from hatched signatures.
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The theorem follows Lemma 1 (security against signers, Lemma 2 (security against
veriﬁers) and Lemma 3 (security against the arbitrator).
Lemma 1 The optimistic fair exchange scheme OFE above is secure against signers.
Proof Suppose that A is a PPT adversary that breaks the security against signers of
OFE with non-negligible advantage A . We construct a PPT algorithm Ā which breaks
the security against the signer of TCS.
Given the time server public key T P K and a time release oracle OTR which simulates the TCS.TRelease algorithm, Ā randomly selects a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ →
T , and runs A on input (T P K, H). During the execution, A has access to oracle
ORes . To answer A’s query (m, ξ, P KUi ), Ā ﬁrst checks the validity of ξ by running
OFE .PVer(m, ξ, P KUi , AP K). If invalid, Ā returns ⊥. Otherwise, it issues a query to
its oracle OTR on input t ← H(m, P KUi ), which returns the corresponding zt . Ā then
computes σ ← TCS.Hatch(m, ξ, P KUi , T P K, zt ) and returns σ back to A. Note that
the above simulation of ORes is perfect.
Finally, A outputs (m, ξ, P K). Without loss of generality, we assume that A wins
the game. This happens with probability A . (If A fails, Ā also fails and halts.) Thus we
get that OFE .PVer(m, ξ, P K, T P K) = 1 and OFE .Ver(m, σ, P K, T P K) = 0, where
σ ← OFE .Res(m, ξ, ASK, P K). This indicates that TCS.TVer(m, ξ, P K, T P K, t) = 1
and TCS. Ver(m, σ, P K, T P K, t) = 0, where t ← H(m, P K). Hence, we let Ā output
(m, t, ξ, P K), and Ā wins its game with probability A .
Remark 3 Note that in the proof, after receiving the output (m, ξ, P K) of A, Ā can
actually compute σ by generating the time event t as described above, issuing a query
to oracle OTR to get zt , and then running σt ← TCS.Hatch( m, ξt , P KA , T P K, zt ).
If t was ever issued by Ā to OTR during the simulation, Ā can simply retrieve the
corresponding zt from its memory instead of issuing a new query. Therefore, Ā can
check the validity of A’s output and decides to output (m, t, ξ, P KA ) or to abort.
Lemma 2 The optimistic fair exchange scheme OFE above is secure against veriﬁers.
Proof Suppose that B is a PPT adversary which breaks the security against veriﬁers of
OFE with non-negligible advantage B , we construct a PPT algorithm B̄ which breaks
the security against the veriﬁer of TCS.
Given the time server public key T P K, the signer’s public key P K, and oracles
OTSig simulating algorithm TCS.TSig, OTR simulating algorithm TCS.TRelease and
OPreH simulating algorithm TCS.PreHatch, B̄ randomly selects a hash function H :
{0, 1}∗ → T , and runs B on input (T P K, P K, H). To simulate oracles OPSig and ORes
for B, B̄ uses OTSig and OTR respectively, as follows.
– When B issues a query to OPSig on input m, B̄ generates time event t ← H(m, P K),
and issues a query to its oracle OTSig on input (m, t), which returns the signer’s
signature ξt . B̄ then returns ξ to B.
– When B issues a valid query to ORes on input (m, ξ, P KUi ), B̄ generates time
event t ← H(m, P KUi ), and issues a query to OTR on input t which returns the
corresponding zt . B̄ then returns σ ← TCS.Hatch(m, ξ, P KUi , T P K, zt ).
It is readily seen that the above simulation is perfect. Finally, B outputs (m, σ).
Without loss of generality, we assume that B wins the game. Thus we have that
OFE .Ver(m, σ, P K, T P K) = 1 and (m, ·, P K) ∈ Query(B, ORes ). Since the hash function H is collision-free, it holds with only negligible probability that t ← H(m, P K) is
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the same as one of the previous time events generated by B̄ during the simulation of
ORes and OPSig . Otherwise, B and B̄ together form an algorithm breaking the collisionfreeness property of H. It is well understood that if t appeared before, B̄ fails and halts.
So we have that B̄ did not issue a query to OTR on input t. Also note that during the
whole execution, B̄ never issued a query to OPreH . Therefore, we can let B̄ output
(m, t, σ) and B̄ succeeds in its game with probability B̄ so |B − B̄ | is negligible in
k. The diﬀerence is due to the negligible probability that a collision of H occurs.
Lemma 3 The optimistic fair exchange scheme OFE above is secure against the arbitrator.
Proof Suppose that C is a PPT adversary which breaks the security against the arbitrator of OFE with non-negligible advantage C , we construct a PPT algorithm C̄
which breaks the security against the time server of TCS.
Given the time server private/public key pair (T SK ∗ , T P K), the public key P K
of the signer Alice, and oracles OTSig simulating algorithm TCS.TSig, and OPreH simulating algorithm TCS.PreHatch, C̄ randomly selects a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → T ,
and runs C on input (T SK ∗ , P K, T P K, H). To simulate the oracle OPSig for C, C̄
generates the time event t as described in the OFE .PSig algorithm, and then issues
a query to OTSig on input (m, t), which returns Alice’s time capsule signature ξ. C̄
returns ξ to C. It’s easy to see that the simulation is perfect.
Finally, C outputs (m, σ). Again, we simply assume C wins its game. This happens with probability C . Thus we have that OFE .Ver(m, σ, P K, T P K) = 1 and
m ∈ Query(C, OPSig ). It indicates that C̄ didn’t issue a query to its oracle OTSig on
input (m, t ) for any t . Also note that during the simulation, B̄ never issued a query
to its oracle OPreH . Therefore, we can let C̄ output (m, t, σ) where t ← H(m, P K), and
B̄ succeeds in its game with probability C .
6 An Instantiation without Random Oracles
Recently, Libert and Quisquater [24] proposed an eﬃcient time capsule signature
scheme proven secure in the standard model based on Waters signature [32], which
in turn is based on Computational Diﬃe-Hellman (CDH) assumption. By instantiating our generic construction above using their time capsule signature scheme, the ﬁnal
scheme will also enjoy the security without random oracles. In this particular scheme,
we even do not need to introduce another collision-resistant hash function either. This
is because the collision-free hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n has already been
employed in Libert-Quisquater time capsule signature scheme. We can simply use H
to map mP KUi into the time event space {0, 1}n , which is exactly the case in their
implementation.
Let G, GT be two cyclic and multiplicative groups of prime order p, and g be a
random generator of G. Let ê : G × G → GT be a bilinear pairing. Let H : {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}n be a collision-resistant hash function. The concrete OFE scheme works as below.
SetupTTP . The arbitrator chooses g2 ∈ G and α ∈ Zp , and computes g1 = g α and
V = ê(g1 , g2 ). It then chooses a random vector v = (v  , v1 , · · · , vn ) ∈ Gn+1 deﬁning
n
t
a function Fv : {0, 1}n → G such that for any t ∈ {0, 1}n , Fv (t) = v  j=1 vjj .
α
The private key of the arbitrator is ASK = g2 and the public key is AP K =
{n, g1 , g2 , v, V }.
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SetupUser . The signer selects β ∈ Zp , h ∈ G and a random (n + 1)-vector u =
deﬁning a function Fu : {0, 1}n → G such that for any
(u , u1 , · · · , un ) ∈ Gn+1 
m
n
n

m ∈ {0, 1} , Fu (m) = u j=1 uj j . Its private key is SK = hβ , and public key is
P K = {h, ĥ, u, U }, where ĥ = g β and U = ê(h, ĥ).
PSig. Given a message m, the signer Ui chooses j1 , j2 ← Zp and computes c = g2j1 g j2
−j2 /j1

and t ← H(m, P KUi ). It then picks r, s ← Zp , computes d1 = cs g1
d2 = g r and d3 =
and

−1/j1
g s g1
.

Fv (t)r , sets

The signer also computes M ← H(mct) ∈ {0, 1}n

(ξ1 , ξ2 ) = (hβ Fu (M )r̂ , g r̂ )

for a randomly chosen r̂ ← Zp . It outputs the partial signature ξ = (ξ1 , ξ2 , c), and
stores (d1 , d2 , d3 ).
PVer. Given (m, ξ = (ξ1 , ξ2 , c)) purportedly produced by Ui , the veriﬁer computes
t ← H(m, P KUi ) and M ← H(mct), and checks if c ∈ G and
ê(ξ1 , g) = U · ê(Fu (M ), ξ2 ).
It outputs 1 if both hold, and 0 otherwise.
Sig. To fully sign a message m, the signer Ui sets t ← H(m, P KUi ) and computes
(ξ1 , ξ2 , c) and (d1 , d2 , d3 ) as in the partial signing algorithm. It outputs the full
signature σ = (ξ1 , ξ2 , c, d1 , d2 , d3 ).
Ver. Given (m, σ = (ξ1 , ξ2 , c, d1 , d2 , d3 ) purportedly produced by Ui , the veriﬁer computes t ← H(m, P KUi ) and M ← H(mct). It outputs 1 if
ê(d1 , g) = V · ê(Fv (t), d2 ) · ê(c, d3 ),
ê(ξ1 , g) = U · ê(Fu (M ), ξ2 ),
and 0 otherwise.
Res. To resolve Ui ’s partial signature ξ = (ξ1 , ξ2 , c) on message m, the arbitrators
returns ⊥ if ξ is not valid. Otherwise, it picks random r̃, s ← Zp and computes
t ← H(m, P KUi ) and
(d˜1 , d˜2 , d˜3 ) = (g2α Fv (t)r̃ cs , g r̃ , g s ).
It outputs σ = (ξ1 , ξ2 , c, d˜1 , d˜2 , d˜3 ).
Libert et al. proved in [24] that their time capsule signature scheme is ambiguous
and secure based on CDH assumption under the model given in Sec. 3.2. Combining
their result and Theorem 1, we obtain the following corollary immediately.
Corollary 1 The OFE scheme above is secure without random oracles provided that
the hash function H is collision-resistant and CDH assumption holds.

7 Comparison
Table 2 shows the comparison of our scheme with some existing results on OFE in terms
of key size, signature size, length of common reference string, underlying assumptions
and the need of random oracle model. As we consider multi-user setting in this work,
we select those schemes proved to be secure in the multi-user setting for comparison
in Table 2.
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From the comparison, we can see that our scheme outperforms others in terms
of signature size. Besides, the security of our scheme relies on the weakest numbertheoretic assumption and is proved in the standard model, while the security of other
schemes are based on stronger assumptions, and are proved in either random oracle
model or common reference model. However, our scheme is based on Waters signature,
and thus inherits its drawback. That is, our scheme suﬀers from long public keys as
well.
Table 2 A detailed comparison with some existing results in the multi-user setting

Apk
Pk
PSig
Sig
Crs
Assump
Model
Notes.

[14]
|n| + 1Zn
1Zp
3t + 2Zq + 1Z∗n
2t + 1Zq + 1Z∗n
RSA + DL
ROM

[22] Inst 1
1G
(k + 3)G
2G
8G
(k + 4)G
CDH
CRS

[22] Inst 2
1G
3G
1G + 1Zn
12G + 5Zn
2G
SDH + SGD
CRS

[22] Inst 3
3G
3G
2G + 2Zp
5G + 5Zp
4G
Poly-SDH
CRS

Ours
(k + 3)G + 1GT
(k + 3)G + 1GT
3G
6G
CDH
STD

– k is the security parameter.
– A ‘-’ in the row of ’Crs’ means that the scheme does not impose a common reference string,
except standard system parameters, e.g. group description and generator.
– Please refer to Table 1 (page 3) for the legends and notes there about the comparison.

8 Conclusion
In this paper we observed that due to the very similar nature with optimistic fair exchange, it is straightforward to build an optimistic fair exchange scheme in the multiuser setting and the certiﬁed-key model from a time capsule signature scheme secure
in the certiﬁed-key model in conjunction with a collision-resistant hash function. Combining recent work on time capsule signatures in the standard model and our generic
transformation, we come up with an eﬃcient optimistic fair exchange scheme secure
without random oracles.
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